Bahman Azadfarâs Conflict with Realpolitik in Sweden Over Money Laundering
From 1991 to 2014, over twenty-three years, I endeavoured to persuade the Swedish authorities that the fight against PenningtvĂ€tt (money laundering) was not merely an economic issue, but rather the foundation for halting Finansiering av terrorism (terrorist financing) and curbing criminal gangs. Yet today, as Swedish cities grapple with the crisis of criminal gang activity, an examination of events reveals that what transpired over these decades, regardless of the decision-makersâ intentions, resulted, in practice, in a âsystematic deceptionâ.
What was implemented in Sweden under the guise of what was called an anti-money laundering regime was, in its structural consequence, nothing but Fusk och fasad (deception and façade); a situation in which the legal appearance was maintained, but the executive will remained effectively hollow.
1. The European Directive versus the Swedish Deadlock
In 2005, the European Parliament clarified the mandate for all member states by adopting Directive 2005/60/EC. Article 1 of this directive explicitly stated: “Member States shall ensure that money laundering and terrorist financing are prohibited.”
However, when transposing this directive into national law in 2009, the Swedish government adopted a âminimalistâ approach. The legislation passed under the title Lag (2009:62) om Ă„tgĂ€rder mot penningtvĂ€tt och finansiering av terrorism focused primarily on administrative formalities rather than direct criminalisation. The consequence of this approach was that, contrary to the spirit of the European Directive, money laundering was not defined as an âindependent offenceâ within Swedish criminal law.
2. Bureaucracy for the People, Enforcement Vacuum for Criminals
Instead of establishing penal instruments, the focus was placed on Rapporteringskrav (reporting requirements). According to Chapter 3, Article 1 of this law, all financial institutions and businesses were mandated to report suspicious activities or transactions utan dröjsmÄl (without delay).
The statistics reveal a stark structural contradiction:
In 2013, approximately 11,000 Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) reached the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), while the unit had only about 15 to 16 specialist personnel at its disposal. This situation meant that widespread reporting did not lead to crime detection but, in practice, resulted in a massive accumulation of unexamined reports. In effect, bureaucracy had come to supersede effective policing.
3. Defining a âMoney Laundering Havenâ in a Legal Vacuum
A ‘money laundering haven’ is a situation in which vast volumes of suspicious funds enter the system, yet no effective legal instruments exist to combat them. In Sweden at the time, even if the FIU identified a report as serious, it lacked the necessary legal tools to seek prosecution.
Until July 2014, the specific offence of âmoney launderingâ did not exist in Swedish law; instead, cases were pursued under the weaker charge of PenninghĂ€leri (handling of stolen goods). Furthermore, the phenomenon of âself-launderingâ (the laundering of money by the primary offender) was not criminalised. Regardless of any political justification, this structural loophole provided a safe passage for the proceeds of crime.
4. Conclusion: Realpolitik versus Justice
Why did this occur? The answer lies in a logical analysis of the systemâs behaviour:
(a) Maintaining International Appearance: Passing legislation without independent criminalisation was a way to alleviate pressure from the European Union, without the financial and political systems facing the challenges of large-scale judicial prosecution.
(b) Outsourcing Oversight: Imposing costs and burdens on ordinary citizens and small businesses was a cheap and low-risk choice for the bureaucracy, whereas a genuine fight against criminal gangs would have incurred a significant cost.
(c) Generating Statistics instead of Security: The requirement for immediate reporting, rather than being a tool for justice, served as a bureaucratic shield, allowing the government to rely on statistics to create an illusion of control.
Recognising this distinction between the âform of lawâ and the âspirit of justiceâ leads us to an understanding of the phenomenon of Non-law.
The 2009:62 law was a âNon-lawâ; a text that, while maintaining its legal shell and formalities, had been emptied of just content. Instead of protecting the rights of the people, it became a tool for the misdirection of public opinion and for safeguarding the interests of the powerful. Exposing this truth is a necessary condition for preventing the theft of peopleâs sovereignty within the corridors of power.